The communist ideology

The communist ideologyThe main up to nowts of the latter half of the twentieth Century remain a topic of intense debate with the abstract thought behind these events still a source of speculation. This essay testament picture the key events in Soviet Foreign polity through the quartette communicateers of the period between 1945-1991 Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev and will be contrasted against the teachings of communist ideology in an effort to determine whether ideology had keener operate in the exotic indemnity decisions made by said leaders or if state interests played a more signifi mintt role.Marxism-Leninism was the ideology of the Soviet kernel. Thus, Marxist-Leninist ideas influenced unusual policy. For a Marxist-Leninist, the world is divided into classes rather than soul states and in strict communist doctrine, the key objective of foreign policy was the ultimate achievement of world revolution by the proletariat. As a end, Marxist-Leninism has no theory of international relations. It was well expressed by Trotsky1 when he was appointed Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1917, I will issue a few rotatory proclamations to the peoples of the world and then fold up shop. Revolution would dis vest the state system and end the rent for diplomacy. On the other hand, failure of a world-wide revolution to take place entertaint that the sate interests of the USSR quickly acquired great importance for Soviet foreign policy-makers. The Soviet concretion increasingly turned to building a Communist party at home, believing that strengthening socialism within the USSR was the way to train a Communist inn revealside of its borders Socialism in unmatchable Country, and that once strengthened, the Soviet coupler would prove strong enough to lead the whole world to Socialism.There are other Marxist-Leninist ideas that strongly influenced foreign policy, one of which was the necessary antagonistic nature of Communism to s tate of warfareds capitalist states, which Stalin strongly rememberd would inevitably lead to war2. Related to this idea was the concept of correlation coefficient of forces the Russian equivalent to our balance of power- where the overall strength of capitalism was measurable against communism. The idea that capitalism suffered from such profound contradictions states competing for resources, frugal problems, led Communists to believe that their system would prevail and therefore were always on the look out for the correlation of forces to change in their favour. It also reinforced the effect of the Leninist purpose of imperialism. Lenin held the view that war would bring the prospect of revolution as the govern classes became demoralised by the burdens placed by war on the states bear on and the working classes plummeted into misery.As previously mentioned, communism was non adverse to war if the outcome would be revolution. This was a belief strongly held by Lenin. Alte rnatively, Stalin, was more interested in war that served his interest. An example of which is the certify World contend officially kn sustain in the Soviet Union as The cooperate Great Patriotic state of war. He reasoned that World state of war I was brought about by capitalists, who inflicted damage and last on each other, that is seen as positive as it led to the emergence of the USSR. After the Second World War, the USSR was left absolutely devastated, the class struggle also had to be balanced with the desire of the Soviet population for peace so that they and their uncouth could recover. Soviet leaders were aware of this desire, which tempered any revolutionary flame they may have felt. Nevertheless the geezerhood to follow were also years of great triumph for the USSR. The destruction of the German army meant the USSR was the only great European force power, had become a permanent member of the UN protective cover Council, and it had broken out of the capitalist encirclement of having allied states on its borders.Stalin seek to increase Soviet power beyond what the Tzars had accomplished now that he had Communist ideology driving him. He was the dominant creator of Soviet foreign policy, the subject of which remains to a lower place dispute by several(prenominal) historians. One such historian, LeFeber entertained the notion that (Stalin) displayed a realism, a particular(prenominal) calculation of forces, and a diplomatic finesse that undercut any try on to explain away his actions as paranoia3, while another criticises Stalins foreign policy as inexplicable in its parts as incoherent in its whole4.It has been argued that Stalins foreign policy from 1945 onwards was a direct result of textile interests and power play with the United States of America, that the USA was now perceived as Glavny Protivnik (greatest adversary) and that Stalin was scared of war because of its strength.The exact origins of the frozen War remain under disput e, even with tonic archival evidence from former Eastern- axis vertebra states. The role to which Stalins foreign policy played in the build up to the chilly War can be cat self-importancerised in a small total of groups. The orthodox view, which entertained Stalins aggressive and expansionist policy, his desired expansion on all of the USSRs borders from the Pacific to the Atlantic, which can be argued to be in adjacent with Marxist-Leninist theories of expansion5, even though he permitted discussion on what governments could be formed within rawly acquired states. It is interesting to melodic phrase that Stalins aggressive and expansionist policy has been attributed to his own declining mental health. He had even been diagnosed, albeit incorrectly, in 1927 as a paranoid schizophrenic nevertheless this diagnosis was proved to be inaccurate. The revisionist view, perceived by Marxist and Marxist-Leninist historians, depicted the USA as an aggressive power, to their own people and others around the globe, imposing its empire on an unwilling world, ignoring the security interests of the Soviet Union and conforming to the classic Leninist pretence of Imperialism.6 This view gained credibility later in the 1960s, partly owing to the Vietnam War. former(a) historians, not Marxist in inspiration, claim that the USA wanted to shew an economic system across the globe which would promote trade and economic growth from which the USA would benefit. Separate to the ideologic views is the notion that the conflict was fateful and thencely both superpowers were responsible for it. That the Cold War was the natural result of a situation in which two superpowers with differing ideologies remained. Tactically speaking, the USSR had only ternary strategic enemies, of which Japan and Ger legion(predicate) had been defeated and China was embroiled in a civil war. In addition, the Soviet Union had the largest army with mobilised resources, it was also geographically th e largest country in the world. The USA on the other hand was a massive economic power and its population had not been morally worn by recent war nor were they at odds with their own government. The resulting shake up between the two would turn into a global disaster. At this time, it appears Stalin preferred to avoid a soldiery confrontation with the USA and having determined that military probes into Europe would be too hazardous, Stalin sought to expand Soviet influence into regions where there would be less risk of confrontation with the USA and so he turned to Asia7.After repeatedly denying approval of nitrogen Korean leader Kim Il Sungs proposed military attack of southbound Korea, the Soviet Union out of the blue(predicate)ly began secretly providing large technological and military assistance to North Korea. This U-turn decision has been cited by both Gaddis and Westad to abide their assertion that Marxism-Leninism was of crucial importance in Soviet foreign policy8. Westad also provided another theory to Stalins unexpected decision change in that Stalin had seen Mao Zedongs Chinese Communist mastery and had been unnerved by it. Stalin therefore gave approval for the attack on South Korean when he completed his rival in Mao would support North Korea with Stalin or without and Stalin did not want to appear less revolutionary than Mao9. Regardless of the ideological reasons, be it enthusiasm in response to Maos ambitions or jealousy and an attempt to outmanoeuvre Mao by condoning North Korea, even an avoidance of the USA to rule out a catastrophic war, it is indicated that ideology was a factor in Stalins foreign policy involvement in Asia.Stalin died in March 1953. He was succeeded by a collective leadership with Nikita Khrushchev short emerging as the main figure. The new leaders quickly realised that changes in foreign policy were necessary the main reason for this beingness the arms race which was now becoming more prominent in world eve nts. In 1952, the USA had detonated the worlds commencement thermonuclear device followed in 1953 with the USSR testing its first hydrogen bomb. In the years that followed, both powers created and well-tried various delivery systems for these new weapons that resulted for the USSR in the creation of Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) which had the range to strike the USA. Khrushchev called these weapons the Gods of War10. The realisation of the enormous power of these new weapons caused Stalins successors to toss key principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The precept of the inevitability of war between capitalism and communism, which in Stalins eyes, would be won by communism, had to be discarded as a conflict would result in the mutual assured destruction of both the capitalist and communist states. In addition, the principle of revolution that, although perceived as inevitable and the only way to a Communist society according to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, could now be the cause of a war that would also end in complete devastation for the warring states and thus it was at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 that a bunch of initiatives were launched which came to be known as destalinization which established a policy of long-term peaceful cooperation with the capitalist world. The superpowers had inadvertently become partners, with the incentive to prevent thermonuclear war.Although there initially appeared to be a change of instruction from Marxist-Leninist doctrine there were still elements of it that were pursued even with the new initiatives in place. The Party leadership was quick to introduce the idea that a peaceful transition to Socialism was still very much possible. The changes to foreign policy included the commencement of armistice talks in areas of conflict, for example, the Korean war. The Soviet government activity also attempted to strengthen its satellite states in the bloc and draw them closer to the USSR. This all culminated in 1955 with the creation of the capital of Poland Treaty Organisation. In addition, a massive amount of economic and technological assistance was given to the communist nation of the Peoples Republic of China. This assistance has been set forth as the greatest transfer of technology in world history11. The regime also encouraged trading and other forms of communication with the Western world, it un resolute up to tourism, Soviet citizens were permitted for the first time to visit other states not in the Eastern bloc of which the reverse was also the same. Stalin, would have avoided this as, in his view, it would have voltagely opened up the USSR to hostile foreign influences. Competing ideological tendencies and institutional interests allied with Khrushchevs own over-ambition in foreign policy were the top factors resulting in his fall from power in 196412.During the Khrushchev years, Brezhnev had supported the process of destalinization but as soon as he became leader, Brezhne v changed direction and reverted to a more regressive, Stalin-type attitude, even taking the title General Secretary, which Stalins held until 1952. Brezhnevs overriding aims were to ensure the primacy of the USSR in the world communist movement. Establish strategic parity in the US and on that basis, to secure western acceptance of the post-war order in Europe while extending Soviet power in the developing world13.The first foreign policy crisis of the Brezhnev regime occurred in 1968 when reforms began sweeping through Czechoslovakia, initiated by leader Alexander Dubcek, that posed the reduction of importance of the ruling Communist party. The Soviet leadership attempted to limit the impact of Dubceks reforms through talks but their efforts proved in vain. Soon aft(prenominal), Soviet and Eastern bloc troops invaded Czechoslovakia tasked with restoring it to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.14 The doctrine was used to disembarrass the invas ion of Czechoslovakia, and also used to put an end to liberalisation efforts that had the potential to disrupt Soviet control within the Eastern bloc. The concerns of the Soviet Union fit an ideology based explanation of Soviet actions. It is interesting to note that while the western states heavily criticised the invasion, they were unable to challenge the Soviet military force in Europe without risking nuclear war.The events surrounding the collapse of Communism and the relatively quiet dissolution of the Soviet Union can be attributed to the euphemistically named Sinatra Doctrine. It was the name that the Soviet government of Mikhail Gorbachev used to describe his new policy of allowing the eastern bloc Warsaw Pact nations to determine their own affairs. This was a complete change of direction from the Brezhnev Doctrine which tightly monitored and controlled the inseparable affairs of the satellite states. For Wohlforth, once Gorbachev was in office, his perception of the USSRs relative descent grew steadily more pessimistic. He had to accept retire after retreat from the Soviets great power commitments, which let to the sudden end of the Cold War15.Gorbachev had many issues facing him, one of which was the prevention of anti-Soviet violence from breaking out. Previously, any demonstrator uprising would have been resolved by military intervention, however if a crisis erupted now, then a massive amount of military intervention would be necessary. It was decided that Soviet policy should aim to achieve two canonical goals avoid direct military intervention at any cost16 and for the quick transition to a new political order to be achieved peacefully. Gorbachev patently could not see that the changes he initiated would lead to the demise of the Soviet bloc, it can be argued that he was depending on like-minded leaders to emerge from the Communist groups in Eastern Europe.17The question of whether communist ideology played a role in the transformation of Soviet policy still remains. If Gorbachev had decided to maintain the orthodox Communist rule in the Soviet bloc and enforce the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet army would have ensured his success. It appears that it was Gorbachevs own choices, on national priorities and a desire to lay to rest all remnants of Stalinism18 that led the Soviet Union down the path to disintegration.While it is undeniable that the ideological differences of capitalist economy and Marxism-Leninism provided the Cold War with a catalyst, it is not outside the realm of incident that differences between the two superpowers left in the power vacuum after the Second World War would not have provided the fuel to conflagrate the conflict themselves. Some of the specific policies adopted by the Soviet leaders could have just as easily been pursued by a non-communist government responding to a tense global situation, however that does not mean ideology had no relevance. It appears that the USSRs state interests w ere themselves influenced by Communist ideology and thus influenced the foreign policy decisions of the leadership.BibliographyCraig Nation, R. 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